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In this study, we investigate the determinants of compliance with the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 2013 framework and whether 
prompt compliance provides a signal of a commitment to a strong internal control environment. 
COSO 2013 framework represents the biggest change to the internal control framework in more 
than two decades. In firms’ first fiscal year following the supersession of the COSO 1992 
framework, only 91 percent of firms in our sample were in compliance with the updated COSO 
2013 framework. We find that compliance with the updated framework is more likely among 
firms that are larger, older, more highly leveraged, less complex, that operate in more litigious 
industries, and that have an effective internal control environment. Controlling for potential 
selection bias, we next examine whether compliance with the updated framework is indicative of 
a higher level of control consciousness and governance as evidenced by more conservative 
financial reporting. Finally, we use short-window market reactions to quarterly earnings 
surprises to examine whether investors perceive compliance with the updated framework as an 
indication of the overall control consciousness and governance of the firm. We find that firms 
that comply with the COSO 2013 framework exhibit more conservative financial reporting and 
that investors react more positively to these firms’ quarterly earnings surprises following initial 
compliance. Importantly, these results hold among a sample of firms without reported material 
weaknesses in internal controls. These results provide evidence that firms can help alleviate 
agency costs by signaling their commitment to a strong internal control environment. 
 







A long stream of research, beginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggests that agency 
problems can arise in corporate settings when there is greater information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders. Prior research also suggests that corporate internal control systems can play an important 
governance role in monitoring managerial behavior and reducing agency costs (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007a; 
Goh and Li 2011). This is not only evidenced by lower earnings quality among firms with weak internal 
control systems (Doyle et al. 2007a), but also by evidence of negative investor reactions to disclosures of 
such weaknesses (Hammersley et al. 2008).  Although the absence of disclosed internal control weaknesses 
provides some indication of the effectiveness of a firm’s control environment, disclosure is limited to known 
weaknesses that could materially impact the reported numbers as of the financial reporting date. No 
disclosure is required for material weaknesses existing during the reporting period but remediated before the 
period end date. Additionally, prior research suggests that a large proportion of firms with material 
weaknesses in internal controls fail to report in a timely manner (Rice and Webber 2012). To help alleviate 
agency costs, managers may make intentional decisions to signal their commitment to a strong control 
environment.  
In this study, we examine whether prompt compliance with the most up to date internal control 
framework signals a commitment to a strong internal control environment. Such a commitment is 
likely to manifest itself in more effective internal controls and more conservative financial 
reporting (Garcia et al. 2009; Goh and Li 2011). Specifically, we investigate determinants of 
prompt compliance with the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) 2013 framework using several factors likely associated with the strength of a firm’s 
overall control environment. We then perform several analyses to investigate whether firms that 
promptly comply with COSO 2013 provide more conservative financial reporting and whether 
 2 
 
investors perceive compliance with the updated framework as an indication of a firm’s 
commitment to a strong system of internal control. 
COSO released its original internal control framework in 1992, which became the basis for auditors 
to assess and report on their clients’ internal control over financial reporting under the provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). However, since the release of this original framework, businesses and 
operating environments have changed dramatically. In response to these changes, COSO introduced its 
updated internal control framework, also known as the 2013 internal control framework, on May 14, 2013 
(hereafter referred to as the COSO 2013 framework). During the transition period from May 14, 2013 to 
December 15, 2014, public firms and their auditors had the choice to use either the original 1992 framework 
or the updated 2013 framework as the underlying basis for their internal control assessment as long as the 
applicable framework was disclosed. Following the transition period, however, COSO considers the 1992 
framework as having been superseded. Despite this, in firms’ first fiscal year following supersession 
of the COSO 1992 framework, we find that only 91 percent of firms in our sample comply with 
the updated COSO 2013 framework.  
We perform our tests using a sample of firms subject to the reporting requirements of Section 
404(b) of SOX, which requires auditor attestation on the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting, with fiscal years ending after December 15, 2014 through May 31, 2016. Because our sample 
period begins after the transition period, firms using the COSO 2013 framework are identified as 
“compliance” firms. We refer to “noncompliance” firms as those that continue to use the COSO 1992 
framework. Our sample consists of 3,564 firms that use the updated COSO 2013 framework, and 347 firms 
that continue to use the original 1992 framework. Building on prior research, (Ge and McVay 2005; 
Doyle et al. 2007b; Feng et al. 2015), we examine the determinants of compliance with the COSO 2013 
framework based on variables associated with the strength of a firm’s control environment, which 
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include the disclosure of material weaknesses in internal controls, firm size, leverage, age, complexity, the 
occurrence of significant or unusual transactions, financial distress, whether the firm operates in a litigious 
industry, and the risk of financial reporting improprieties. We find that compliance is more likely among 
firms that do not disclose internal control weaknesses, are larger, more highly leveraged, older, less 
complex, are involved in more merger and acquisition activity, have restructuring charges, and 
operate in a more litigious industry.  
Next, we examine the relation between compliance with the COSO 2013 framework and financial 
reporting conservatism. We employ three measures of conservatism: C_SCORE developed by Khan and 
Watts (2009), CON_ACC suggested by Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ahmed et al. (2002), and the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings following Basu (1997). Because compliance with the COSO 2013 
framework is not randomly determined, we address the possibility of selection bias by estimating 
a two-stage Heckman selection model. We use the determinants model discussed above as our 
first stage model. To satisfy the exclusion restriction, we use the indicator variable for whether 
the firm is a client of KPMG.1 From this model, we derive the inverse Mills ratio to control for 
the unobservable factors associated with the decision to comply with the COSO 2013 
framework. After controlling for known determinants of accounting conservatism and for 
potential self-selection bias, we find a positive association between firms complying with the COSO 
2013 framework and all three measures of conservatism. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis 
that firms promptly complying with the COSO 2013 framework exhibit a commitment to control 
consciousness and strong governance.  
                                                 
1 Based on discussions with a COSO board member, KPMG did not encourage early compliance with the updated 
framework. We believe this variable meets the criteria of an exclusion restriction variable as it should affect the 
decision to comply, but should not necessarily affect the outcome variables of our second stage models. We include 
an indicator variable for whether the firm’s auditor is KPMG and find that this variable negatively predicts the likelihood of 
compliance with the COSO 2013 framework.  
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We next examine whether investors perceive compliance with the COSO 2013 framework 
as an indication of a higher level of control consciousness and governance, as evidenced by more 
positive short-window market reactions to quarterly earnings surprises. We find that firms 
complying with the COSO 2013 framework experience more positive short-window reactions to quarterly 
earnings surprises, suggesting that investors perceive these firms’ earnings to be more informative and of 
higher quality. In further analysis, we incorporate pre-implementation quarterly observations 
beginning with firms’ second fiscal quarter of 2013 and use a difference-in-difference estimation to 
determine whether the investor reaction to quarterly earnings surprises is incrementally higher in the 
quarters following disclosure of COSO 2013 compliance. We document a higher earnings response 
coefficient in the quarters following disclosure of COSO 2013 compliance, providing further evidence that 
prompt compliance with the updated framework signals the firm’s overall commitment to control 
consciousness and governance.  
In additional analyses, we examine whether these relations hold when limiting our sample to firms 
without disclosed internal control weaknesses. If prompt compliance with the updated COSO framework 
does indeed provide an indication of a strong commitment to internal control and governance, then we 
would expect to observe a consistent result among firms with no reported weaknesses in internal controls for 
which investors have less ability to differentiate variation in the strength of the internal control environment. 
Consistent with our expectation, we find that among firms with no reported weaknesses in internal control, 
prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework is associated with greater financial reporting 
conservatism and more positive market reactions to quarterly earnings surprises.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the results of this study highlight that a 
non-trivial amount of companies did not comply with the COSO 2013 framework following supersession 
of the COSO 1992 framework. To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the determinants of 
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compliance with the COSO 2013 framework. Second, this study contributes to the literature by examining 
whether prompt compliance with an updated internal control framework can serve as a signal of a strong 
system of internal controls (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007a; Goh and Li 2011) to help alleviate agency costs. The 
results support this notion. Specifically, compliance with the COSO 2013 framework is associated with 
more conservative financial reporting and improves investors’ perceptions of the underlying quality of the 
earnings numbers. These results highlight the importance of prompt compliance with future framework 
updates, new rules, or new regulation involving internal control over financial reporting. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews prior literature and develops 
the hypotheses. Section III describes sample selection and research design. Section IV presents our main 
results. Section V provides additional analyses. Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
COSO’s 2013 Internal Control Framework 
On May 14, 2013, COSO released its updated internal control framework, known as the COSO 
2013 framework.2 At the time, the COSO Board considered it proper for public companies to continue to 
use their original 1992 framework during the transition period between May 14, 2013 and December 15, 
2014 (COSO 2013). During this period, companies and their auditors were required to clearly disclose 
which framework they used. Following the transition period, the original 1992 framework is considered 
superseded by COSO. The COSO 2013 framework is similar to the original 1992 framework, but provides 
several significant changes. Although the five components of a firm’s internal control system – control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities 
– remain intact, the updated framework provides “explicit articulation of the 17 principles” that are meant to 
codify the fundamental concepts related to those five components (COSO 2013). In addition to these 




relevant 17 principles, the COSO 2013 framework introduces 81 points of focus which provide greater 
detail and insight into the principles. The primary goal of the updated COSO 2013 framework is to enhance 
assessment and evaluation to determine if the explicitly stated principles are present and functioning (i.e., 
less ambiguity), reflect increased relevance and use of technology and related controls, incorporate 
enhanced discussion of governance concepts, enhance anti-fraud expectations, and  increase the focus on 
non-financial reporting objectives.  
Determinants of Compliance with COSO 2013 Framework 
To date, there is no research that examines the determinants of compliance with the 
COSO 2013 framework. If prompt compliance is indicative of firms’ commitment to strong 
governance and a strong internal control environment then we would expect that the likelihood 
of compliance will vary based on factors associated with the strength of a firm’s internal control. 
Doyle et al. (2007b) investigate several potential firm characteristics that determine internal 
control material weaknesses using 779 firms that disclose material weaknesses from August 
2002 to 2005. Relying on prior research findings, we examine whether these firm characteristics, 
which include the disclosure of material weakness in internal control, firm size, leverage, age, 
complexity, the occurrence of unusual or significant transactions, financial distress, litigation 
risk, and the risk of misstatement, are associated with compliance with the COSO 2013 
framework. We elaborate on each of these firm characteristics below. Because the disclosure of a 
material weakness in internal controls is a clear indication of a weak internal control 
environment, we argue that prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework will be less 
likely for these firms. Our first hypothesis (stated in alternative form) is as follows: 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, firms with disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls are less 




Apart from the disclosure of a material weakness in internal controls, other firm 
characteristics should be associated with the overall internal control environment of the firm. For 
example, firm size has been shown to be associated with stronger internal control systems (Ge 
and McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007b). Smaller firms tend to have less sophisticated internal 
control systems and fewer resources than larger firms (e.g., fewer investments in technology or 
less experienced or competent staff). Smaller firms are also less likely to benefit from economies 
of scale when they manage and operate their internal control systems (Doyle et al. 2007b). 
Furthermore, smaller firms are more likely to have limited time and resources to monitor their 
internal control system. The adoption and implementation of the COSO 2013 framework 
requires dedicated resources to identify relevant changes necessary to internal controls, update 
existing documentation, and ensure compliance with the new framework. Smaller firms with 
greater resource constraints are likely at a disadvantage. This leads to our next hypothesis (stated in 
alternative form): 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, larger firms are more likely to comply with the COSO 2013 framework 
immediately following the transition period. 
We also consider a firm’s financial leverage as a potential factor affecting compliance 
with the COSO 2013 framework. On the one hand, highly leveraged firms may not have 
sufficient resources and funds to allocate to the adoption and implementation of the COSO 2013 
framework. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage may have sufficient (or more) cash to 
acquire the resources necessary to promptly comply with the new framework. As such, we do not 
make a directional prediction on the association between leverage and compliance with the 
COSO 2013 framework. Our next hypothesis (stated in null form) is as follows: 
H1c: Ceteris paribus, compliance with the COSO 2013 framework immediately following the 
transition period is not associated with more highly leverage firms. 
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Firm age is also a potential determinant of compliance with the COSO 2013 framework. 
Because younger firms are growing and changing more rapidly, these firms may not have 
resources to establish or invest in a sophisticated internal control system (Feng et al. 2015). 
Additionally, they may be reluctant to invest the time and resources necessary for prompt 
compliance. Thus, we expect that older firms are more likely to comply with the COSO 2013 
framework, which leads to the following hypothesis (stated in the alternative):  
H1d: Ceteris paribus, older firms are more likely to comply with the COSO 2013 framework 
immediately following the transition period. 
Firm complexity could influence prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework. 
Doyle et al. (2007b) find that firm complexity increases the likelihood of disclosing a material 
weakness in internal controls. Complex firms may need more time to assess and document 
compliance with the updated internal control framework. Thus, we expect that a more complex 
firm will be less likely to promptly comply with COSO 2013 framework. This leads to the 
following hypothesis (stated in the alternative):  
H1e: Ceteris paribus, more complex firms are less likely to comply with the COSO 2013 
framework immediately following the transition period. 
We also consider whether the occurrence of significant or unusual transactions during the 
year the updated framework becomes effective. Restructuring and merger and acquisition 
activities are a time-consuming process for a firm. Not only will these types of events affect the 
structure of the firm and its related internal controls and processes, but they will divert the time 
and attention of the accounting and financial reporting staff that would also likely be responsible 
for assessing and updating documentation related to compliance with the COSO 2013 
framework. These types of activities have been shown to increase the likelihood of material 
weaknesses in internal control (Doyle et al. 2007b). Thus, we expect that firms undergoing 
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restructuring and involved in merger and acquisition activity are more likely to delay compliance 
with the COSO 2013 framework. This leads to the following hypothesis (stated in the 
alternative):  
H1f: Ceteris paribus, compliance with the COSO 2013 framework immediately following the 
transition period is less likely among firms experiencing restructuring or merger and 
acquisition activity. 
Additionally, firms in financial distress may lack the necessary resources to dedicate to 
prompt compliance with the updated framework. As such, we expect that firms experiencing 
financial distress are less likely to comply with the COSO 2013 framework. This leads to our 
next hypothesis (stated in alternative form): 
H1g: Ceteris paribus, financially distressed firms are less likely to comply with the COSO 2013 
framework immediately following the transition period. 
Finally, we examine whether litigation risk or misstatement risk affect the likelihood of 
complying with the updated framework. Firms in litigious industries may be more inclined to 
adhere to industry norms to avoid potential litigation. Although compliance with the COSO 2013 
framework is not enforced by a regulatory authority, managers may believe that noncompliance 
would increase the risk of litigation. Firms with greater misstatement risk may have weaker 
internal controls. If the control environment is weak, prompt compliance may be less likely. As 
such, we hypothesize the following (stated in the alternative): 
H1h: Ceteris paribus, firms in litigious industries are more likely to comply with the COSO 
2013 framework immediately following the transition period; and  
H1i: Ceteris paribus, firms with greater misstatement risk are less likely to comply with the COSO 
2013 framework immediately following the transition period. 
COSO 2013 Framework Compliance and Accounting Conservatism 
The COSO 2013 framework is designed to reflect the environment surrounding organizations 
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(COSO 2013) and should enable organizations to effectively design, implement, and reevaluate their 
internal controls associated with operating, reporting, and compliance objectives (COSO 2013). Prior 
research suggests that effective internal controls can act as an important corporate governance mechanism in 
monitoring managerial behavior and thus mitigating agency problems (Jensen 1993). Consistent with this, 
prior studies document that firms with internal control material weaknesses have lower financial reporting 
quality (Doyle et al. 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008), higher information risk (Beneish et al. 2008; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009), and less accurate management guidance (Feng et al. 2009). Furthermore, Goh 
and Li (2011) find that internal control quality is positively related to conditional accounting conservatism. 
They find that firms with material weaknesses in internal controls exhibit less conservative financial 
reporting. They also find that firms that subsequently remediate material weaknesses exhibit greater 
conservatism compared to firms that continue to report material weaknesses in internal controls. Prior 
studies also highlight how conservative policies and choice on accounting matters helps alleviates agency 
conflicts between mangers and shareholders (Holthausen and Watts 2001; Ahmed et al. 2002; Watts 2003a; 
Ball and Shivakumar 2006). Consistent with this, Garcia et al. (2009) find a positive association 
between conditional accounting conservatism and strong corporate governance. The results of 
these studies suggest that conservative financial reporting is indicative of a commitment to control 
consciousness and governance. 
To help alleviate agency costs, managers may promptly comply with the updated framework to 
signal the firm’s commitment to strong governance and a strong internal control environment. As 
such, we expect that prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework is positively associated with 
accounting conservatism. This leads to the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form): 
H2: Ceteris paribus, firms that comply with the COSO 2013 internal control framework after 
the transition period have more conservative accounting than noncompliance firms. 
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COSO 2013 Framework Compliance and Investor Perceptions of Earnings Quality 
If compliance with the COSO 2013 framework is an intentional signal of management’s 
commitment to a strong internal control environment then investors should find these firms’ 
earnings more informative relative to noncompliance firms. Prior research finds that investors 
react negatively to internal control weakness disclosures (Hammersley et al. 2008) suggesting 
increased risk or uncertainty in that firm’s future earnings. Additionally, firms’ earnings 
response coefficients increase after the improvements or enhancements to governance and 
internal controls. For example Chan et al. (2012) find increased earnings response coefficients 
following adoption of compensation clawback provisions. Given that compliance with the 
COSO 2013 framework is a potential signal of a firm’s commitment to a strong internal control 
environment and higher financial reporting quality, we hypothesize that market participants 
find quarterly earnings surprises more informative for these firms relative to the earnings 
surprises of noncompliance firms, particularly after the initial disclosure of compliance. This 
leads to the following hypothesis (stated in alternative form): 
H3: Ceteris paribus, firms that comply with the COSO 2013 internal control framework after 
the transition period have higher quarterly earnings response coefficients than noncompliance 
firms, which are incrementally more informative following initial disclosure of compliance.  
III. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN     
Sample Selection 
To obtain the sample, we use the Audit Analytics database to identify whether firms disclose 
compliance with the COSO 2013 framework in the first fiscal year following the effective date of the 
updated framework (i.e., firms with fiscal years ending after December 15, 2014 through May 31, 2016). 
We obtain data related to internal control weaknesses and going concern opinions, from Audit Analytics. 
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We obtain annual financial data from the Compustat annual database and monthly stock return data from 
the CRSP database. We collect segment data from the Compustat Segment file. We merge these datasets 
and remove firms in financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) (Ahmed and Duellman 2013). We allow 
our sample sizes to vary slightly based on data availability for the variables in the respective models.  
Empirical Models 
Determinants of Compliance with COSO’s 2013 Framework 
We first examine the determinants of compliance with the COSO 2013 framework using 
a sample of firms with fiscal years ending after December 15, 2014 through May 31, 2016. As discussed 
above, we model the likelihood of prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework as a function of 
firm characteristics associated with the strength of a firm’s internal control. To do this, we estimate 
the following logistic regression model: 
      Prob (Compliancei,t =1) = F(β0 +β1ICMWi,t + β2Sizei,t + β3Leveragei,t + β4Firm_Agei,t           
                      + β5Segmentsi,t + β6Foreign_Operationsi,t + β7M&Ai,t  
            + β8Restructuringi,t + β9Aggregate_Lossesi,t + β10Going_Concerni,t  
            + β11Litigationi,t + β12F_SCOREi,t + β13KPMGi,t),            (1) 
where Compliance is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal 
framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. We build on prior research findings 
examining determinants of internal control weaknesses (Doyle et al. 2007a), and examine 
whether compliance with the updated framework is a function of disclosure of material 
weaknesses in internal control, firm size, leverage, age, complexity, the occurrence of unusual or 
significant transactions, financial distress, litigation risk, and the risk of misstatement. We 
measure firm size (Size) using the natural logarithm of total assets. We measure leverage 
(Leverage) as the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets. We measure firm 
age (Firm_Age) using the natural logarithm of the number of years a firm has data on the CRSP 
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database. We capture firm complexity using the natural logarithm of the sum of the number of 
operating and geographic segments (Segments) and an indicator variable for whether the firm has 
foreign operations (Foreign_Operations). We capture significant or unusual transactions using 
an indicator variable for whether a firm has restructuring charges (Restructuring) and an 
indicator variable for whether a firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition during the year 
(M&A). We capture financial distress using an indicator variable if the firm reports a loss in the 
current and prior year (Aggregate_Losses) and an indicator variable if the firm received a going-
concern audit report modification (Going_Concern). Following Francis et al. (1994), we use an 
indicator variable for firms in litigious industries (i.e., SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–
3674, 5200–5961, and 7370) (Litigation). Following Dechow et al. (2011), we use the F-score to 
capture misstatement risk (F_SCORE).3 Finally, we include an indicator variable if the firm’s 
auditor is KPMG (KPMG) based on discussions with a COSO board member suggesting that 
KPMG did not encourage early compliance with the updated framework. Additionally, we 
control for industry fixed effects in equation (1) and use robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Compliance with COSO’s 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
We next investigate the relation between compliance with the COSO 2013 framework 
and accounting conservatism. To do this, we estimate the following OLS regression model: 
        ACC_Conservatismi,t = β0 + β1Compliancei,t + β2Sizei,t  + β3Leveragei,t  
                                                               + β4Market-to-Booki,t + β5ROAi,t + β6Firm_Agei,t  + β7Sales_Growthi,t 
                                          + β8Rd_Advi,t + β9Litigationi,t + β10Big4i,t + β11Inverse_Mills_Ratioi,t  
                                          + Σi,tIndustry_Dummy + ɛi,t,                                                                 (2) 
                                                 
3 We provide a detailed summary of the construction of the F-score in Appendix C. 
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where ACC_Conservatism represents three different dependent variables, C_SCORE, 
CON_ACC, and CON_SKEWNESS. We estimate C_SCORE, a measure of conditional 
conservatism, following Khan and Watts (2009) (See Appendix B for more details). Larger 
values of C_SCORE indicate greater conditional accounting conservatism. Additionally, we use 
a measure of unconditional conservatism, CON_ACC, following Givoly and Hayn (2000), 
Ahmed et al. (2002), and Ahmed and Duellman (2013). We calculate CON_ACC as net income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation expense minus cash flow from operations, deflated 
by average total assets, averaged over a 3-year period centered on year t. We multiply this 
measure by negative one so that higher values of CON_ACC mean greater unconditional 
accounting conservatism. Finally, we use another unconditional conservatism measure, 
CON_SKEWNESS, following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013). This 
measure is calculated as the difference between cash flow skewness and earnings skewness. The 
skewness of cash flow (earnings) is defined as (𝑥 − 𝜇)3/𝜎3 where 𝑥 is cash flows (earnings), 
and 𝜇 and 𝜎 are the mean and standard deviation of cash flows (earnings) over the last five years. 
Higher values of CON_SKEWNESS indicate greater unconditional accounting conservatism. We 
control for industry fixed effects in equation (2) and use robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level.  
The variable of interest in equation (2) is an indicator variable, Compliance, which we 
predict to be positive. Based on prior studies (Ahmed et al. 2002; Ahmed and Duellman 2007, 
2013; Givoly et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; LaFond ad Roychowdhury 2008; 
LaFond and Watts 2008; Goh and Li 2011; Zhang 2012), we control for firm characteristics and 
external auditor characteristics that have been shown to affect accounting conservatism. 
Specifically, we control for firm size (Size) as LaFond and Watts (2008) document that larger 
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firms have less information asymmetry, thereby decreasing the demand for conservatism. In 
contrast, as Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue, large firms are more likely to face large 
political costs so that they engage in more conservative accountings. Given the two sides of the 
argument, we expect no relationship between ACC_Conservatism and Size. We also include firm 
leverage (Leverage) as a control variable. Ahmed et al. (2002) argue that highly leveraged firms 
tend to have more conservative accounting due to their greater bondholder-shareholder conflicts. 
Following Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013), we control for 
the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book). Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find a negative relation 
between accounting conservatism and the market-to-book ratio. Firms with high market-to-book 
ratio are likely to have more growth opportunities, thereby increasing information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. Thus, there will likely be an increase in demand for accounting 
conservatism (LaFond and Watts 2008). We control for return on assets (ROA) because Ahmed 
et al. (2002) document that firms with a higher return on assets choose more conservative 
accounting. We include firm age (Firm_Age) because Khan and Watts (2009) predict a negative 
relation between firm age and accounting conservatism. We expect that accounting conservatism 
decreases with firm age. Following Ahmed et al. (2002), we control for sales growth 
(Sales_Growth). Ahmed et al. (2002) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007, 2013) find that sales 
growth is negatively related to the accrual-based conservatism measure, CON_ACC. We expect a 
negative relation between CON_ACC and Sales_Growth. We control for research and 
development (R&D) and advertising expenditures (Rd_Adv) as Ahmed and Duellman (2007, 
2013) argue that firms with high R&D and advertising expenditures use more conservative 
accounting. Following Basu (1997) and Watts (2003a), we control for whether a firm is a 
member of a litigious industry (Litigation). We also control for whether a firm is audited by a 
 16 
 
Big 4 auditor (Big4). We expect firms with a Big 4 auditor to be more conservative. We include 
the inverse Mills ratio (Inverse_Mills_Ratio) from the determinants model in equation (1) to 
control for the unobservable factors associated with a firm’s decision to comply with the COSO 
2013 framework. Finally, as in Givoly et al. (2007), we include industry fixed effects to control 
for variation in accounting conservatism across industries. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
Our third proxy for accounting conservatism is based on the Basu (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness measure. Building on the Basu (1997) specification, we estimate the following 
regression model:  
                   NIi,t = β0 + β1DRi,t + β2Compliancei,t + β3Sizei,t + β4Leveragei,t   
                                       + Β5Market-to-Booki,t + β6Litigationi,t +β7DRi,t*Compliancei,t 
                                       + β8DRi,t* Sizei,t  + β9DRi,t*Leveragei,t + β10DRi,t*Market-to-Booki,t  
                                       + β11DRi,t*Litigationi,t + β12RETi,t +β13RETi,t*Compliancei,t  
                                       + β14RETi,t*Sizei,t  +β15RETi,t*Leveragei,t + β16REi,t*Market-to-Booki,t  
                                       + β17RETi,t *Litigation + β18DRi,t*RETi,t + β19DRi,t*RETi,t*Compliancei,t  
                                      + β20DRi,t*RETi,t*Sizei,t + β21DRi,t*RETi,t*Leveragei,t  
                                      + β22DRi,t*RETi,t*Market-to-Booki,t + β23DRi,t*RETi,t*Litigationi,t                                
                          +Σi,tIndustry_Dummy + ɛi,t,                                                                                  (3)                                                         
where NI is defined as the earnings before extraordinary items divided by the market value of 
equity at the beginning of the fiscal year. DR is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s 
return is negative and zero otherwise. RET is the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. The 
variable of interest in equation (3) is β19, the coefficient on the triple interaction of DR, RET, and 
Compliance, which we predict to be positive. As in equation (2), we control for industry fixed 
effects. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Compliance with COSO’s 2013 Framework and Investor Perceptions of Earnings Quality 
We next investigate whether compliance with the COSO 2013 framework affects 
investor perceptions about the quality of the firm’s earnings. To do this, we examine whether 
the short-window earnings response coefficient (ERC) to quarterly earnings surprises is more 
positive for compliance firms. To do this, we estimate the following OLS regression model 
following Francis and Ke (2006) and Ghosh et al. (2009):  
CAR = β0 + β1FERRq + β2Compliance + β3FERRq*Compliance + βX + βIndustry FE +  
βQuarter-Year FE + βFERRq*X + βFERRq*Industry FE + βFERRq*Quarter-Year 
FE + ɛit          (4) 
 
where CAR is the abnormal (i.e., market-adjusted) returns cumulated over days [-1, +1] relative 
to the quarterly earnings announcement. FERR is the analyst forecast error, measured as the 
difference between reported quarterly earnings per share and the most recent median consensus 
analyst earnings forecast, deflated by prior quarter stock price. X is a vector of control variables 
following prior research (Francis and Ke 2006; Ghosh et al. 2005; Ghosh et al. 2009), which 
includes the absolute value of FERR (absFERR), an indicator variable if net income for the 
quarter is less than zero (Loss), an indicator variable if special items is five percent or more of 
total assets (Restructure), the ratio of short and long-term debt to total equity (DE), an indicator 
variable for the last fiscal quarter in the respective year (QTR4), the natural log of the market 
value of equity (LnMV), and the standard deviation of market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns 
(STD_Return).4 Finally, we include industry and quarter-year fixed effects to control for 
variation in short-window cumulative abnormal returns across industries and over time.  
                                                 
4 Market-adjusted are calculated as the difference between raw returns and the value-weighted market returns from 
the CRSP database over the previous 60 months.  
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Consistent with prior research, the ERC is the coefficient on FERR. The variable of 
interest in equation (4) is β3, the coefficient on the interaction of FERR and Compliance, which 
we predict to be positive. A positive coefficient would indicate that market participants find the 
earnings of compliance firms more informative than the earnings of noncompliance firms.  
To strengthen inferences that prompt compliance with COSO 2013 serves as a signal to 
market participants, we include in the sample pre-implementation quarterly observations 
beginning with firms’ second fiscal quarter of 2013 through May 2016 and use a difference-in-
difference estimation with the following regression model: 
CAR = β0 + β1FERRq + β2Compliance + β3FERRq*Compliance + β4POST + 
β5FERRq*POST + β6POST*Compliance + β7FERRq*Compliance*POST +  
ΒX + βIndustry FE + βQuarter-Year FE + βFERRq*X + βFERRq*Industry FE + 
βFERRq*Quarter-Year FE + ɛit           (5) 
where POST is an indicator variable for firms’ quarterly observations that follow the initial 
disclosure of compliance with COSO 2013. This variable is then interacted with FERR and 
COMPLIANCE to capture whether investors perceive quarterly earnings surprises to be incrementally 
more informative for compliance firms relative to noncompliance firms following compliance. The 
variable of interest in equation (5) is β7, which we predict to be positive. 
IV.  RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. Panel A shows 
that approximately 91 percent of companies in the sample comply with the COSO 2013 
framework in the first fiscal year following implementation. Panel B shows that the mean 
(median) values of the accounting conservatism measures, C_SCORE, CON_ACC, and 
CON_SKEWNESS, are 0.402 (0.369), 0.022 (0.012), and 0.457 (0.018), respectively. These 
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values are relatively higher than those found in Ahmed and Duellman (2013) probably due to 
differences in sample composition and the period under examination. Panel C shows the mean 
(median) values of the variables used in the short-window earnings response coefficients (ERC).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the compliance and noncompliance firms 
separately, and differences in mean and median values between the compliance and 
noncompliance firms. We examine mean differences using t-tests and median differences using 
Pearson chi-square tests. The mean differences in Size, Leverage, KPMG, ICMW, Segments, and 
M&A are statistically significant under the t-test. These initial results suggest that compliance 
firms are larger, more highly leveraged, less likely to be audited by KPMG, and have less 
material weaknesses in internal control compared to noncompliance firms. Compliance firms 
also are less complex in that they have fewer operating and geographic segments. However, 
inconsistent with our expectation, we find that compliance firms are more likely to engage in 
merger and acquisition activity, and some evidence that compliance firms have higher 
misstatement risk.  
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables. In Panel A, 
Compliance has a positive and significant (p<0.01) correlation with Size. In contrast, Compliance 
is negatively and significantly correlated with KPMG, ICMW, and Segments (p<0.01). Panel B 
shows that the correlation coefficient between C_SCORE and CON_ACC is positive and 
significant (p<0.01). The primary correlation of interest is between Compliance, and C_SCORE 
and CON_ACC, respectively. As expected, we find a significant positive correlation between two 
proxies for accounting conservatism, C_SCORE and CON_ACC, and Compliance. Consistent 
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with our expectation, C_SCORE has negative and significant (p<0.01) correlations with Market-
to-Book, Sales_Growth, Rd_Adv, and Litigation. We also find positive and significant (p<0.01) 
correlation coefficients between C_SCORE, and Size, Leverage, Firm_Age, and Big4, 
respectively. On the other hand, CON_ACC is positively and significantly (p<0.01) correlated 
with Leverage and Rd_Adv, respectively, and negatively and significantly (p<0.01) correlated 
with Size, ROA, and Firm_Age.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Regression Results 
Determinants of Compliance with COSO 2013 Framework 
We next discuss our multiple variable regression results. Table 4 shows the results of 
estimating equation (1) to test Hypotheses 1a through 1h. Consistent with H1a, we find a 
negative and significant (p<0.001) coefficient on ICMW in columns (2) and (3), suggesting that 
firms with weaker internal controls are less likely to comply with the COSO 2013 framework. 
Consistent with H1b, we find that the coefficient on Size is positive and significant (p<0.001) 
across all three columns, which indicates that larger firms are more likely to comply with the 
COSO 2013 framework after the transition period. Consistent with H1e, we find that the 
coefficient on Segments is negative and significant (p<0.001) in all columns, suggesting that firm 
complexity delays compliance. In column (3), we find that firms with higher misstatement risk 
(F_SCORE) are less likely to comply promptly, consistent with H1h. We also find that the 
coefficient on KPMG is negative and significant (p<0.001) in all columns, consistent with our 
discussions with a COSO board member suggesting that KPMG was less likely to encourage 
clients’ prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework. We fail to find evidence in support 
of H1c, H1d, H1f, and H1g.  
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 [Insert Table 4 here] 
COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
In this section, we investigate the relation between compliance with the COSO 2013 
framework and accounting conservatism using our three proxies for accounting conservatism. 
Table 5 presents the results of the pooled OLS regression examining the conditional 
conservatism measure, C_SCORE as the dependent variable. We present the results without 
inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio in Column (1), and we present the results with the inverse 
Mills ratio in Column (2). In both columns, we find that the coefficient on Compliance is 
positive and significant (p<0.001), indicating that firms that comply with the COSO 2013 
framework use more conservative accounting relative to noncompliance firms. The sign of 
coefficients on control variables are consistent across all columns. Although inconsistent with 
prior research findings (LaFond and Watts 2008; Goh and Li 2011; Ahmed and Duellman 2013), 
we find a positive and significant (p<0.001) coefficient on Size suggesting that larger firms use 
more conditionally conservative accounting. Consistent with Ahmed and Duellman (2013), the 
coefficient on Leverage is positive and significant (p<0.001), indicating that highly leveraged 
firms have more conservative accounting. We also find a negative and significant (p<0.001) 
coefficient on Market-to-Book consistent with Ahmed and Duellman (2013). The coefficient on 
Firm_Age is positive and significant (p<0.001), indicating that older firms exhibit greater 
accounting conservatism. We find insignificant associations between C_SCORE and ROA, 
Sales_Growth, Rd_Adv, Litigation, Big4, and the inverse Mills ratio, suggesting that more 
conservative accounting is not associated with the unobservable factors associated with prompt 
compliance.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Table 6 presents the results of the pooled OLS regressions with our second proxy of 
unconditional conservatism measure, CON_ACC as a dependent variable. Column (1) presents 
the results without the inverse Mills ratio, and Column (2) presents the results with the inclusion 
of the inverse Mills ratio. Consistent with Table 5, we find that the coefficient on Compliance is 
positive and significant (p<0.01) Consistent with the findings of Ahmed and Duellman (2013), 
we find a negative and significant (p<0.001) coefficient on Size, and a positive and significant 
(p<0.01) coefficient on Leverage. Unlike findings in Ahmed and Duellman (2013), we find a 
positive and significant (p<0.001) coefficient on Market-to-Book. We find a negative and 
significant (p<0.001) on ROA and on Firm_Age, indicating that that firms with a higher return on 
assets and that are older use less conservative accounting. The coefficient on Rd_Adv is positive 
and significant (p<0.1), consistent with Ahmed and Duellman (2013). We also find that the 
coefficient on Big4 is positive and significant, indicating that firms audited by Big 4 auditors 
exhibit greater accounting conservatism. In Column (2), we find a negative and significant 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio. 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 7 presents the results of the pooled OLS regressions examining the unconditional 
conservatism measure, CON_SKEWNESS as the dependent variable. Consistent with Tables 5 
and 6, we find a positive and significant coefficient on Compliance in both columns. We also 
find that the coefficients on Firm_Age, Rd_Adv, Litigation are negative and significant. The 
coefficient on Big4 is positive and significant in Column (2) and the coefficient on 
Inverse_Mills_Ratio is significantly negative, indicating the importance to control for the 
unobservable factors associated with COSO 2013 compliance.  
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
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Table 8 presents the results of the pooled OLS regression using the Basu (1997) 
specification for asymmetric timeliness as a proxy for conditional accounting conservatism. We 
find that the coefficient on D*Return*Compliance is positive and significant (p<0.10). This 
positive relation suggests that compliance firms tend to engage in more conservative accounting, 
compared to noncompliance firms. The coefficient on D*Return*Size is negative and significant 
(p<0.001), suggesting that larger firms use less conservative accounting. We find a positive and 
significant (p<0.001) coefficient on the coefficient on D*Return*Leverage. This finding 
indicates that higher leveraged firms have more conservative accounting.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Taken together, the results in Tables 5 through 8 suggest that firms that promptly comply 
with the COSO 2013 framework provide more conservative financial reporting relative to 
noncompliance firms. To the extent that conservative accounting reflects strong governance 
practices and a strong internal control environment, prompt compliance with the updated COSO 
framework is a means to alleviate agency costs by signaling this commitment to external parties.  
Compliance with COSO’s 2013 Framework and Investor Perceptions of Earnings Quality 
Table 9 presents the results of the tests of our third hypothesis examining investor 
perceptions of compliance with the COSO 2013 framework. Specifically, we examine the short-
window market response to quarterly earnings surprises. Consistent with prior research, we find 
a positive and significant earnings response coefficient (FERR) in both columns. With regard to 
H3, we find that the coefficient on FERR*Compliance in column (1) is positive and significant 
(p=0.002). We also find a positive and significant coefficient on FERR*Compliance*POST in 
column (2) (p=0.028). Taken together, these findings suggest that investors find quarterly 
earnings surprises more informative for firms complying with the COSO 2013 framework, relative 
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to noncompliance firms, and that this informativeness is incrementally higher following initial disclosure of 
compliance.   
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Subsample Tests with Non-ICMW Firms 
Our findings suggest that prompt compliance with the updated COSO framework can help 
to alleviate agency costs by signaling a commitment to strong internal controls. However, this 
signaling would be most important for firms without reported material weaknesses. Given that 
firms with reported material weaknesses in internal control are less likely to promptly comply 
with the COSO 2013 framework, we examine whether our results are robust to excluding these 
firms reporting material weaknesses in internal controls from the analyses. Table 10 presents the 
results of our tests examining the association between compliance with COSO 2013 and 
accounting conservatism as well as investor perceptions of the quarterly earnings of compliance 
firms. Panels A through C present the results using three proxies for accounting conservatism 
(C_SCORE, CON_ACC, and CON_SKEWNESS). In all three panels, we continue to find a 
positive and significant coefficient on Compliance. In Panel D, we re-examine our short-window 
ERC tests after excluding firms reporting material weaknesses in internal controls. We find 
consistent evidence that even among firms not reporting material weaknesses in internal controls, 
that investors perceive prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework as a signal of a 
commitment to a strong internal control environment.   
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Possibility of Omitted Variable Bias 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we consider the possibility of omitted variable 
bias. Following Ahmed and Duellman (2013), we add cash flows from operations (CFO) and 
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volatility of sales (Sales_Vol) and re-estimate the previous equation (2) using three conservatism 
measures. CFO is measured as cash flows from operations divided by average total assets. 
Sales_Vol is calculated as the standard deviation of the natural sales between year t-1 and t-5. In 
this analysis, we exclude return on assets (ROA) because CFO and ROA are highly correlated 
and thus it may lead to multicollinearity problems.5 The pooled OLS regression model is as 
follows: 
       ACC_Conservatismi,t = β0 + β1Compliancei,t + β2Sizei,t  + β3Leveragei,t  
                                                               + β4Market-to-Booki,t + β5Firm_Agei,t + β6CFOi,t+ β7Sales_Voli,t  
                                                               + β8Sales_Growthi,t + β9Rd_Advi,t + β10Litigationi,t + β11Big4i,t  
                                                                + β12Inverse_Mills_Ratioi,t + Σi,tIndustry_Dummy  + ɛi,t,                     (6) 
where ACC_Conservatism represents three proxies for accounting conservatism, C_SCORE, 
CON_ACC, and CON_SKEWNESS and all other variables as previously defined. We continue to 
find consistent results with those previously tabulated. Specifically, the coefficients on 
Compliance in all columns are positive and significant in Panel A. In Panel B, we find consistent 
results when limiting the sample to firms not reporting material weaknesses in internal control. 
Thus, our primary findings are robust to this alternative model specification.  
 [Insert Table 11 here] 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examine whether prompt compliance with the COSO 2013 framework provides 
an indication of a commitment to a strong internal control environment. We first investigate 
determinants of prompt compliance with the new framework and then perform several analyses 
to investigate whether prompt compliance is associated with more conservative financial 
                                                 




reporting. Finally, we examine whether investors perceive compliance with the updated 
framework as an indication of a firm’s commitment to a strong system of internal control. 
We find that compliance is more likely among firms that do not disclose internal control 
weaknesses, are larger, more highly leveraged, older, less complex, are involved in more merger 
and acquisition activity, have restructuring charges, and operate in a more litigious industry. We 
find robust evidence that firms that comply with the COSO 2013 framework provide more 
conservative financial reporting. Finally, we find that investors find quarterly earnings surprises 
more informative for firms complying with the COSO 2013 framework, relative to noncompliance 
firms, and that this informativeness is incrementally higher in the quarters following the initial compliance. 
These results suggest that prompt compliance provides a signal to market participants about the 
firm’s control consciousness and governance. 
This study contributes to the literature by examining whether prompt compliance with the COSO 
2013 internal control framework can serve as a signal of a strong system of internal controls (e.g., Doyle et 
al. 2007a; Goh and Li 2011) to help alleviate agency costs and highlight the importance of prompt 
compliance with future framework updates, new rules, or new regulation involving internal control over 
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Panel A: Determinants of Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework 
Compliance An indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal 
framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise; 
Size The natural logarithm of total asset (Compustat data item AT); 
Leverage The sum of long-term debt (Compustat data item DLTT) and short-term debt 
(Compustat data item DLC) divided by total assets (AT); 
Firm_Age The natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has CRSP database; 
KPMG An indicator variable equal to one if the firm was audited by KPMG during the 
current year zero otherwise (Audit Analytics database); 
ICMW An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm has internal control 
weaknesses (Audit Analytics database) and zero otherwise; 
Going_Concern An indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm receives going concern 
opinion from its auditor and zero otherwise (Audit Analytics database) and zero 
otherwise; 
Segments The natural logarithm of the sum of the number of operating and geographic 
segments (Compustat Segments Database); 
Foreign_Operations An indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports foreign operations 
(Compustat data item FCA) and zero otherwise; 
M&A An indicator variable equal to one if a firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition 
(Compustat data item AQP or AQEPS) and zero otherwise; 
Restructuring An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has restructuring charges 
(Compustat data item RCP or RCEPS) and zero otherwise; 
Aggregate_Losses An indicator variable equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat data item IB) in years t and t-1 sum to less than zero and zero 
otherwise; 
Litigation Following Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), we set an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm falls in a high litigation risk industry as identified by SIC 
codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370; 
F_SCORE A fraud risk measure developed by Dechow et al. (2011). 
Panel B: Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
 Proxies for Accounting Conservatism 
C_SCORE We use a measure of conditional conservatism, C-Score, developed by Khan and 
Watts (2009); 
CON_ACC Following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ahmed et al. (2002), we use a measure 
of unconditional conservatism, calculated as the net income before extraordinary 
items (Compustat data item IBC) plus depreciation expense (Compustat data 
item DP) minus cash flow from operations (Compustat data item OANCF), 
deflated by average total assets, and averaged over a 3-year period centered on 
year t, multiplied by negative one; 
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CON_SKEWNESS Following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013), we use 
another unconditional conservatism measure, CON_SKEWNESS. This measure 
is calculated as the difference between cash flow skewness and earnings 
skewness. The skewness of cash flow (earnings) is defined as (𝑥 − 𝜇)3/𝜎3 
where 𝑥 is cash flows (earnings), and 𝜇 and 𝜎 are the mean and standard 
deviation of cash flows (earnings) over the last five years; 




Compliance Same definition as in Panel A; 
Size Same definition as in Panel A; 
Leverage Same definition as in Panel A; 
Market-to-Book The ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets; 
ROA The operating income before depreciation (Compustat data item OIBDP) divided 
by total assets (Compustat data item AT); 
Firm_Age Same definition as in Panel A; 
Sales_Growth Same definition as in Panel A; 
Rd_Adv Research and development costs (Compustat data item XRD) plus advertising 
expense divided by sales;  
Litigation Same definition as in Panel A; 
Big4 An indicator variable equal to one if the firm was audited by a Big 4 auditor 
during the current year zero otherwise (Audit Analytics database); 
Inverse_Mills_Ratio The inverse Mills ratio from equation (1). 
NI The earnings before extraordinary items divided by the market value of equity at 
the beginning of the fiscal year; 
DR An indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s return is negative and zero 
otherwise; 
RET The buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. 
Panel C: Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Investor Perceptions of Earnings 
Quality 
CAR The abnormal (i.e., market-adjusted) returns cumulated over days [-1, +1] 
relative to the quarterly earnings announcement; 
FERR The analyst forecast error, measured as the difference between reported quarterly 
earnings per share and the most recent median consensus analyst earnings 
forecast, deflated by prior quarter stock price; 
absFERR The absolute value of FERR; 
Loss An indicator variable if net income for the quarter is less than zero; 
Restructure An indicator variable if special items is five percent or more of total assets;  
DE the ratio of short and long-term debt to total equity; (QTR4), (LnMV), and  
QTR4 An indicator variable for the last fiscal quarter in the respective year; 
LnMV The natural log of the market value of equity; 
 31 
 
STD_Return The standard deviation of market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over the 
previous 60 months; 
POST An indicator variable for firms’ quarterly observations that follow the initial 


















 Khan and Watts’ C-Score 
 
Khan and Watts (2009) develop a measure of conditional accounting conservatism, C-Score. 
They estimate of the timelines of good news (G-Score) and bad news (C-Score). Following Khan 
and Watts (2009), we estimate G-Score and C-Score as follows: 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖                                                (1) 
𝐺 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽3 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖                       (2) 
𝐶 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽4 = 𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜆3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜆4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖                         (3) 
where, the subscript i indicates the firm, X is earnings, RET is returns, D is an indicator variable 
that equals to one when RET<0 and zero otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of 
equity. MTB is the market-book-to ratio, measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity. LEV is firm leverage, measured as the total debt divided by market value of 
equity.  Substituting 𝛽3 and 𝛽4 derived from equations (2) and (3) into regression equation (1) 
yield: 
  𝑋𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖 + 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 ∗ (𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜇3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜇4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖) 
      +𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 ∗ (𝜆1 + 𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝜆3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝜆4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖) 
      +(𝛿1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛿4𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛿5𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿6𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖) + 𝑒𝑖       (4)                                                                                                            
Using annual cross-sectional regressions, we estimate above equation (4). Next, we obtain G-
Score and C-Score from the estimated coefficients from equation (4). In our analysis, we use C-












 Dechow et al.’s F-score 
 
Dechow et al. (2011) develop a fraud risk measure to capture a firms’ financial statement 
manipulation. To do this, they use SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAER) database. The F-score is derived from the following equation: 
                     PV = −7.893 + 0.790*RSST + 2.518*ΔREC + 1.191*ΔINV 
                                              + 1.979*SOFT_ASSETS + 0.171*ΔCS − 0.932*ΔROA + 1.029*ISSUE 
where: 
RSST = (ΔWC + ΔNCO + ΔFIN)/Average Total Assets, where Δ is the change operator,        
                         WC = (Current Assets − Cash and Short-Term Investments) – (Current Liabilities   
                       − Debt in Current Liabilities); NCO = Total Assets − Current Assets –  
                         Investments and Advances – (Total Liabilities − Current Liabilities − Long-Term  
                        Debt); FIN = (Short-Term Investments + Long-Term Investments) − (Long-Term  
                        Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities + Preferred Stock);  
 ΔREC = ΔAccounts Recevables/Average Total Assets; 
 ΔINV = ΔInventory/Average Total Assets; 
 SOFT_ASSETS = (Total Assets – PP&E – Cash and Cash Equivalent)/Total Assets; 
 ΔCS = percentage change in cash sales, where cash sales = Sales − ΔAccounts  
                        Recevables; 
 ΔROA = change in return on assets, where return on assets = Net Income/Total Assets; 
 ISSUE = an indicator variable that equals to one if the firm issued securities during the  
                          current period and zero otherwise. 
 
Using the above PV, we calculate the F_SCORE as follows: (ePV/ (1+ePV))/ (0.0037), where e 










Descriptive Statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics for relevant variables. Our sample contains firms with a fiscal 
year ending after December 15, 2014 through May 31, 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Determinants of Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework 
Variables N Mean Std. dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
Compliance 3,911 0.9113 0.2844 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Size 3,911 7.3714 1.8551 6.0325 7.3001 8.6322 
Leverage 3,911 0.2788 0.2327 0.0760 0.2594 0.4117 
Firm_Age 3,911 2.6089 1.0379 2.0794 2.8332 3.2958 
KPMG 3,911 0.1792 0.3836 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ICMW 3,911 0.0547 0.2275 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Going_Concern 3,911 0.0194 0.1381 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Segments 3,911 1.8470 0.7942 1.3863 1.9459 2.3979 
Foreign_Operations 3,911 0.4280 0.4949 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
M&A 3,911 0.3797 0.4854 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Restructuring 3,911 0.3608 0.4803 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Aggregate_Losses 3,911 0.3102 0.4626 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Litigation 3,911 0.2690 0.4435 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
F_SCORE 3,911 0.5109 0.5948 0.1462 0.2877 0.6342 
Panel B: Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
C_SCORE 2,815 0.402 0.166 0.288 0.369 0.486 
CON_ACC 2,455 0.022 0.057 -0.005 0.012 0.035 
CON_SKEWNESS 3,247 0.457 3.569 -0.899 0.018 1.661 
Compliance 2,815 0.901 0.299 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Size 2,815 7.474 1.892 6.117 7.370 8.808 
Leverage 2,815 0.271 0.220 0.088 0.253 0.396 
Market-to-Book 2,815 3.617 6.577 1.359 2.256 3.970 
ROA 2,815 0.083 0.178 0.068 0.110 0.159 
Firm_Age 2,815 3.029 0.663 2.565 2.996 3.466 
Sales_Growth 2,815 0.064 0.321 -0.058 0.031 0.123 
Rd_Adv 2,815 2.378 50.298 0.000 0.013 0.084 
Litigation 2,815 0.293 0.455 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Big4 2,815 0.847 0.360 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Panel C: Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Investor Perceptions of Earrings Quality 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl. Median 75th Pctl. 
CAR 17,160 -0.001 0.078 -0.034 0.000 0.034 
FERR 17,160 0.000 0.065 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
Compliance 17,160 0.899 0.302 1.000 1.000 1.000 
absFERR 17,160 0.006 0.065 0.001 0.002 0.004 
Loss 17,160 0.243 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restructure 17,160 0.039 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DE 17,160 0.343 104.820 0.122 0.563 1.193 
QTR4 17,160 0.154 0.361 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LnMV 17,160 7.536 1.682 6.315 7.443 8.589 
STD_Return 17,160 0.030 0.006 0.025 0.025 0.037 






Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics of Compliance versus Noncompliance Firms 
This table shows descriptive statistics for each group, compliance and noncompliance sample, for the sample period of December 15, 2014 through May 31, 
2016. The sample consists of 3,911 firm-year observations. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Compliance Sample  
(n = 3,564 observations)  
 
Noncompliance Sample  




























Size 7.423 1.862 6.069 7.350 8.693  6.842 1.698 5.583 6.835 7.866    -6.031*** 16.812*** 
Leverage 0.281 0.233 0.080 0.263 0.414  0.257 0.231 0.038 0.226 0.396    -1.858*      3.425* 
Firm_Age 2.612 1.053 2.079 2.833 3.296  2.577 0.866 2.079 2.773 3.091    -0.696      1.989 
KPMG 0.141 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.576 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000   16.025***  408.225*** 
ICMW 0.048 0.214 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.121 0.327 0.000 0.000 0.000     4.066***    32.380*** 
Going_Concern 0.019 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.029 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000     1.111      1.761 
Segments 1.824 0.797 1.386 1.792 2.398  2.085 0.728 1.609 2.197 2.639     6.325***    36.043*** 
Foreign_Operations 0.424 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.470 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000     1.630      2.707 
M&A 0.384 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.337 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000    -1.748*      2.923* 
Restructuring 0.364 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.329 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000    -1.335      1.717 
Aggregate_Losses 0.308 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.329 0.470 0.000 0.000 1.000     0.764      0.601 
Litigation 0.269 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.268 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000    -0.043      0.002 






Table 3  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables. Correlations in bold indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level (two-
tailed test). The sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Determinants of Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework  
 (1)    (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Compliance 1.00              
(2) Size 0.09 1.00             
(3) Leverage 0.03 0.30 1.00            
(4) Firm_Age 0.01 0.23 -0.07 1.00           
(5) KPMG -0.32 0.04 0.04 0.00 1.00          
(6) ICMW -0.09 -0.10 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 1.00         
(7) Going_Concern -0.02 -0.13 0.15 -0.05 0.00 0.10 1.00        
(8) Segments -0.09 0.37 -0.01 0.21 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 1.00       
(9) Foreign_Operations -0.03 0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.34 1.00      
(10) M&A 0.03 0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.10 0.05 1.00     
(11) Restructuring 0.02 0.19 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.20 0.15 0.19 1.00    
(12) Aggregate_Losses -0.01 -0.37 0.02 -0.19 -0.05 0.10 0.18 -0.20 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 1.00   
(13) Litigation 0.00 -0.23 -0.19 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.19 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.19 1.00  
(14) F_SCORE 0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.31 0.07 -0.10 0.05 1.00 
 
Panel B: Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) C_SCORE 1.00                       
(2) CON_ACC 0.01 1.00                     
(3) Compliance 0.08 0.03 1.00                   
(4) Size 0.35 -0.12 0.10 1.00                 
(5) Leverage 0.74 0.06 0.05 0.32 1.00               
(6) Market-to-Book -0.44 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 1.00             
(7) ROA -0.02 -0.35 0.01 0.31 -0.04 0.05 1.00           
(8) Firm_Age 0.06 -0.12 0.08 0.31 -0.01 0.01 0.12 1.00         
(9) Sales_Growth -0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.11 1.00       
(10) Rd_Adv -0.15 0.21 0.01 -0.25 -0.12 0.09 -0.54 -0.09 0.08 1.00     
(11) Litigation -0.18 0.03 0.01 -0.19 -0.16 0.12 -0.18 -0.11 0.16 0.30 1.00   




Determinants of Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework 
This table shows the results of analyzing the determinants of compliance with the COSO 2013 framework. To do 
this, we use logit models with a binary dependent variable, Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The 
sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 
1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Dependent Variable: Pr (Compliance=1) 














































Restructuring 0.242  
(0.098) 









































Intercept        Yes               Yes                Yes 
Industry fixed effects        Yes               Yes                Yes 
Number of observations        3,780              3,780               3,780 






Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, C_SCORE. The main 
explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The 
sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Dependent Variable: C_SCORE 
Explanatory Variables Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Compliance + 0.029  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.028  
(<0.001) 
*** 
Size – 0.009  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.009  
(<0.001) 
*** 
Leverage + 0.557  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.556  
(<0.001) 
*** 









Firm_Age ? 0.010  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.010  
(<0.001) 
*** 
























                 Yes                   Yes 
Industry fixed effects                   Yes                   Yes 
Number of observations 
 
                2,815                  2,680 
Adjusted R2 
 








Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, CON_ACC. The main 
explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The 
sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Dependent Variable: CON_ACC 
Explanatory Variables Predicted Sign (1)                  (2) 
Compliance + 0.011  
(0.001) 
*** 0.006  
(0.076) 
* 
Size – -0.003  
(<0.001) 
*** -0.004  
(<0.001) 
*** 
Leverage + 0.021  
(0.006) 
*** 0.021  
(0.006) 
*** 



















Rd_Adv + 0.006  
(0.054) 
* 0.005  
(0.053) 
* 






Big4 + 0.009  
(0.028) 










                  Yes                   Yes 
Industry fixed effects                    Yes                   Yes 
Number of observations 
 
                 2,455                  2,330 
Adjusted R2 
 







Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, CON_SKEWNESS. The 
main explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. 
The sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  Dependent Variable: CON_SKEWNESS 
Explanatory Variables Predicted Sign (1)                  (2) 
Compliance + 0.828  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.517  
(0.028) 
** 









Market-to-Book – 0.015 
 (0.124)  
0.013 
 (0.194)  




Firm_Age ? -0.144  
(0.075) 
* -0.166  
(0.044) 
** 




Rd_Adv + -0.231  
(0.030) 
** -0.254  
(0.017) 
** 
Litigation ? -0.449  
(0.075) 
* -0.448  
(0.072) 
* 












                  Yes                   Yes 
Industry fixed effects                    Yes                   Yes 
Number of observations 
 
                 3,152                  3,040 
Adjusted R2 
 






Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism: Basu Specification 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with Basu's (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure as a proxy for 
conditional accounting conservatism. The Compliance is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 
internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 
31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 






Basu’s (1997) Specification 
  Estimated 
  Coefficient 
P-value 
DR                 -0.019 0.521 
Compliance                  0.014 0.202 
Size       0.007*** 0.001 
Leverage                 -0.041 0.185 
Market-to-Book                 -0.000 0.926 
Litigation      -0.042*** 0.006 
DR*Compliance   0.033* 0.075 
DR*Size                  0.000 0.941 
DR*Leverage                  0.065 0.112 
DR*Market-to-Book                 -0.001 0.493 
DR*Litigation                 -0.022 0.130 
Return +                -0.114* 0.088 
Return*Compliance +                -0.035 0.432 
Return*Size +      0.026*** 0.002 
Return*Leverage −                -0.124 0.306 
Return*Market-to-Book +                -0.001 0.643 
Return*Litigation − -0.012 0.711 
DR*Return +      0.301** 0.031 
DR*Return*Compliance +        0.240*** 0.005 
DR*Return*Size −      -0.054*** 0.001 
DR*Return*Leverage +       0.602*** <0.001 
DR*Return*Market-to-Book −                -0.007* 0.090 
DR*Return*Litigation +                -0.077 0.251 
Intercept  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes 
Number of observations  3,643 









Short-Window ERC Tests 
This table shows the results of the short-window ERC tests. The Compliance is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm 
uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The sample period for the column (1) 
is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. The sample period for the column (2) is between 2013Q2 and May 31, 
2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 








Dependent variable: CAR 
(2) 
Dependent variable: CAR 
  Estimated 





FERR + 4.711* 0.068 1.101*** 0.007 
Compliance  0.002 0.364 -0.004 0.311 
FERR*Compliance +/? 0.446*** 0.002 -0.249 0.423 
POST    -0.001 0.857 
FERR*POST    -0.567* 0.079 
POST*Compliance    0.005 0.331 
FERR*Compliance*POST +   0.638** 0.028 
absFERR  -0.116 0.127 -0.111 0.104 
Loss  -0.019*** 0.000 -0.022*** <0.001 
Restructure  0.002 0.714 0.000 0.899 
DE  -0.000*** 0.007 -0.000** 0.010 
QTR4  0.013*** 0.000 -0.002 0.805 
LnMV  -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** <0.001 
STD_Return  0.103 0.730 0.164 0.498 
Intercept   Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Qtr-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
FERR*Controls   Yes Yes 
FERR*Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
FERR*Qtr-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Number of observations  17,160 28,035 






Table 10  
Subsample Tests with Non-ICMW Firms 
Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, C_SCORE. The main 
explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The 
sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A  Dependent Variable: C_SCORE 
Explanatory Variables Predicted Sign (1) (2) 
Compliance + 0.032  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.030  
(<0.001) 
*** 
Size – 0.009  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.009  
(<0.001) 
*** 
Leverage + 0.557  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.557  
(<0.001) 
*** 









Firm_Age ? 0.010  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.011  
(<0.001) 
*** 
























                 Yes                   Yes 
Industry fixed effects                   Yes                   Yes 
Number of observations 
 
                2,624                  2,497 
Adjusted R2 
 





Table 10 (Continued) 
Subsample Tests with Non-ICMW Firms 
Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, CON_ACC. The main 
explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The 
sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel B  Dependent Variable: CON_ACC 
Explanatory Variables Predicted Sign (1)                  (2) 
Compliance + 0.010  
(0.003) 
*** 0.007  
(0.048) 
** 





Leverage + 0.018  
(0.023) 
** 0.019  
(0.021) 
** 





























Big4 + 0.010  
(0.018) 










                  Yes                   Yes 
Industry fixed effects                    Yes                   Yes 
Number of observations 
 
                 2,298                  2,183 
Adjusted R2 
 





Table 10 (Continued) 
Subsample Tests with Non-ICMW Firms 
Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with a dependent variable, CON_SKEWNESS. The 
main explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. 
The sample period is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel C  Dependent Variable: CON_SKEWNESS 
Explanatory Variables Predicted Sign (1)                  (2) 
Compliance + 0.834  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.498  
(0.051) 
* 





Leverage + 0.558  
(0.093) 
* 0.453  
(0.184)  









Firm_Age ? -0.133  
(0.099) 
* -0.156  
(0.063) 
* 




Rd_Adv + -0.220  
(0.037) 
** -0.208  
(0.053) 
* 
Litigation ? -0.442  
(0.086) 
* -0.457  
(0.073) 
* 
Big4 + 0.375  
(0.048) 










                  Yes                   Yes 
Industry fixed effects                    Yes                   Yes 
Number of observations 
 
                 3,009                  2,830 
Adjusted R2 
 




Table 10 (Continued) 
Short-Window ERC Tests (Using Non-ICMW Firms) 
This table shows the results of the short-window ERC tests. The Compliance is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm 
uses the COSO 2013 internal framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The sample period for the column (1) 
is between December 15, 2014 and May 31, 2016. The sample period for the column (2) is between 2013Q2 and May 31, 
2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 








Dependent variable: CAR 
(2) 
Dependent variable: CAR 
  Estimated 





FERR + 5.148* 0.055 1.802*** 0.001 
Compliance  0.003 0.132 -0.003 0.400 
FERR*Compliance +/? 0.407** 0.011 -0.149 0.691 
POST    -0.002 0.786 
FERR*POST    -0.658* 0.074 
POST*Compliance    0.005 0.345 
FERR*Compliance*POST +   0.651** 0.047 
absFERR  -0.049 0.575 -0.161* 0.069 
Loss  -0.017*** 0.000 -0.020*** 0.000 
Restructure  0.004 0.319 0.003 0.366 
DE  -0.000*** 0.006 -0.000*** 0.007 
QTR4  0.012*** 0.000 -0.005 0.551 
LnMV  -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
STD_Return  -0.034 0.912 0.163 0.509 
Intercept   Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Qtr-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
FERR*Controls   Yes Yes 
FERR*Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
FERR*Qtr-year fixed effects   Yes Yes 
Number of observations  16,020 26,391 









Possibility of Omitted Variable Bias 
Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with each dependent variable, C_SCORE, 
CON_ACC, and CON_SKEWNESS. The main explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, 
Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal 
framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The sample period is between December 15, 2014 and 
May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-
tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 




C_SCORE CON_ACC CON_SKEWNESS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Compliance + 0.029  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.028  
(<0.001) 




* 0.722  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.494  
(0.028) 
** 
Size − 0.009  
(<0.001) 





















*** 1.405  
(<0.001) 
*** 

















































*** 0.037  
(<0.001) 
*** 1.418  
(<0.011) 
*** 1.309  
(<0.001) 
*** 
























*** 0.018  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.542  
(<0.001) 
*** 0.522  
(<0.001) 
*** 




































   -0.651 
(0.039) 
** 
Intercept  Yes          Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes          Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  2,809 2,674 2,455 2,330 3,241 3,049 





Table 11 (Continued) 
Possibility of Omitted Variable Bias (Using Non-ICMW Firms) 
Compliance with the COSO 2013 Framework and Accounting Conservatism 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regression with each dependent variable, C_SCORE, 
CON_ACC, and CON_SKEWNESS. The main explanatory variable of our interest is an indicator variable, 
Compliance. The Compliance is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm uses the COSO 2013 internal 
framework after December 15, 2014 and zero otherwise. The sample period is between December 15, 2014 and 
May 31, 2016. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The p-values are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-
tailed test). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 




C_SCORE CON_ACC CON_SKEWNESS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





























































































































































Inverse_Mills_Ratio ?  -0.010 
(0.073) 
*  -0.005 
(0.409) 
   -0.781 
(0.026) 
** 
Intercept  Yes          Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes          Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  2,621 2,494 2,298 2,183 3,009 2,830 
Adjusted R2  0.775 0.775 0.281 0.282 0.106 0.109 
 
